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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-1729
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UNITED STATES, et al., PETITIONERS v.
TEXAS et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the fifth circuit
[April 5, 1993]

  Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
  In this case we decide the question left open in West
Virginia v. United States, 479 U. S. 305, 312-313, n. 5
(1987): whether Congress intended the Debt Collection Act
of 1982 (Act) to abrogate the United States' federal
common law right to collect prejudgment interest on debts
owed to it by the States.  We hold that it did not.
  Texas incurred the instant debts as a result of partici-
pation in the Food Stamp Program, 78 Stat. 703, as
amended, 7 U. S. C. 2011 et seq.  Under that program,
the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) of the United States
Department of Agriculture provides food stamp coupons
to participating States, and the States then distribute the
coupons to qualified individuals and households.
2013(a), 2014.  Regulations implementing the Food
Stamp Program permit participating States to distribute
the coupons either over-the-counter or through the mail.
7 CFR 274.3(a) (1986); 7 CFR 274.3 (a)(3) (1992).  While
mail issuance generally is cheaper and more convenient,
States that choose to use that distribution method must
reimburse the Federal Government for a portion of
the replacement cost for any lost or stolen coupons.  7
U. S. C. 2016(f).  Specifically, a State must reimburse
the Government for all such losses above a -tolerance
level- set by regulation.
  Texas, through its Department of Human Services,
contractually bound itself to comply with all fed-
eral regulations governing the program.  See 7 CFR
272.2(a)(2), 272.2(b)(1) (1986).  Texas incurred substan-
tial mail issuance losses, in part because United States
Postal employees stole food stamps that had been mailed
by the Texas Department of Human Services to qualified
households.  Because those losses exceeded the applicable
tolerance level, Texas was bound to reimburse the Federal
Government for the excess losses.  The FNS notified Texas
of its debt in the amount of $412,385, and informed it
that prejudgment interest would begin to accrue on the
balance unless payment was made within 30 days.
  Texas sought administrative relief in the form of a
waiver of liability.  After the Food Stamp Appeals Board
denied the requested relief, Texas sued the United States
in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas.  In addition to challenging the Appeals
Board's refusal to grant a waiver of liability, Texas argued
that the Debt Collection Act precluded the imposition of
prejudgment interest on any amount it owed the Federal
Government.  The District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of the United States on both issues.
With respect to the prejudgment interest issue, the
District Court adopted the approach taken by the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Gallegos v. Lyng, 891
F. 2d 788 (1989), which held that the Government's
common law right to prejudgment interest on debts owed
to it by the States survived enactment of the Debt Collec-
tion Act.  See Civ. Action Nos. A-87-CA-774, A-88-CA-820
(WD Tex., Nov. 13, 1990).
  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's decision concerning waiver, but reversed
its decision concerning prejudgment interest.  951 F. 2d
645 (1992).  Relying on the language of the Debt Collec-
tion Act, the Court held that the -Act is not silent con-
cerning whether or not state obligations should be subject
to prejudgment interest.  The Act specifically excludes
states from the payment of interest.-  Id., at 651.  Be-
cause Congress did not impose interest through the
specific provisions of the Food Stamp Act -during the time
period relevant in this case, the Courts are not free to
`supplement' Congress' enactment.-  Ibid. (quoting Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, 625 (1978)).
The Court rejected the argument that abrogation is
inconsistent with the Act's purpose of enhancing the
Government's ability to collect its debts.  In the Court's
view, the Federal Government could enforce its claims for
unpaid mail issuance losses through the offset procedures
built into the Food Stamp Act.  Because of a split among
the Courts of Appeals on this question, we granted
certiorari, 506 U. S. ___ (1992), and now reverse.
  It is a -longstanding rule that parties owing debts to
the Federal Government must pay prejudgment interest
where the underlying claim is a contractual obligation to
pay money.-  West Virginia v. United States, 479 U. S.,
at 310 (citing Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313
U. S. 289, 295-297 (1941)).  In Board of Comm'rs of
Jackson County v. United States, 308 U. S. 343 (1939), we
held that this common law right extends to debts owed
by state and local governments, but cautioned that a
federal court considering the question in an individual
case should weigh the federal and state interests involved.
We reaffirmed Board of Comm'rs in West Virginia, supra,
and upheld the assessment of prejudgment interest on a
debt owed by West Virginia to the United States.
  Just as longstanding is the principle that -[s]tatutes
which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a
presumption favoring the retention of long-established and
familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the
contrary is evident.-  Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343
U. S. 779, 783 (1952); Astoria Federal Savings & Loan
Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. ___, ___ (1991) (slip op., at
3).  In such cases, Congress does not write upon a clean
slate.  Astoria, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 2-3).  In order
to abrogate a common law principle, the statute must
-speak directly- to the question addressed by the common
law.  Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, supra, at 625;
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, 315 (1981).
  Texas argues that this presumption favoring retention
of existing law is appropriate only with respect to state
common law or federal maritime law.  Although a differ-
ent standard applies when analyzing the effect of federal
legislation on state law, Milwaukee, supra, at 316-317,
there is no support in our cases for the proposition that
the presumption has no application to federal common
law, or for a distinction between general federal common
law and federal maritime law in this regard.  We agree
with Texas that Congress need not -affirmatively pro-
scribe- the common law doctrine at issue.  Brief for
Respondents 3-4; see Milwaukee, supra, at 315.  But as
we stated in Astoria, supra, -courts may take it as a given
that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the
[common law] principle will apply except `when a statutory
purpose to the contrary is evident.'-  501 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 3) (quoting Isbrandtsen, supra, at 783).
  The Debt Collection Act does not speak directly to the
Federal Government's right to collect prejudgment interest
on debts owed to it by the States.  The Act states that
-[t]he head of an executive or legislative agency shall
charge a minimum annual rate of interest on an outstand-
ing debt on a United States Government claim owed by
a person. . . .-  31 U. S. C. 3717(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Section 3701, in turn, provides that the term -`person'
does not include an agency of the United States Govern-
ment, of a State government, or of a unit of general local
government.-  3701(c).  Texas argues that this exemption
clearly establishes Congress' intent to relieve the States
of their common law obligation to pay prejudgment
interest.  We disagree.
  The only obligation from which 3701 exempts the
States is the obligation to pay prejudgment interest in
accordance with the mandatory provisions of the Act.
These impose a stringent minimum interest requirement
upon private persons owing money to the Federal Govern-
ment.  The statute is silent as to the obligation of the
States to pay prejudgment interest on such debts.  We
agree with the Solicitor General that -Congress's mere
refusal to legislate with respect to the prejudgment-
interest obligations of state and local governments falls far
short of an expression of legislative intent to supplant the
existing common law in that area.-  Brief for Petitioners
16.
  Our conclusion that the States remain subject to com-
mon law prejudgment interest liability is supported by the
fact that the Debt Collection Act is more onerous than the
common law.  Section 3717(a) requires federal agencies to
collect prejudgment interest against persons and specifies
the interest rate.  The duty to pay prejudgment interest
under the common law, however, is by no means auto-
matic.  Before imposing prejudgment interest, the
courts must weigh the competing federal and state inter-
ests.  West Virginia, 479 U. S., at 309-311; Board of
Comm'rs, 308 U. S., at 350.  And instead of imposing a
pre-established rate of interest, the district courts retain
discretion to choose the appropriate rate in a given case.
Unlike the common law, 3717 also imposes processing
fees and penalty charges, 31 U. S. C. 3717(e)(1), (e)(2).
Given these differences, it is logical to conclude that the
Act was intended to reach only one subset of potential
debtors-persons-and to leave the other subset alone.
It is reasonable to apply more stringent requirements to
debts owed by private persons and to keep the more
flexible common law in place for debts owed by state and
local governments.
  The evident purpose of the Debt Collection Act rein-
forces our reading of the plain language.  The Act was
designed -[t]o increase the efficiency of Government-wide
efforts to collect debts owed the United States and to
provide additional procedures for the collection of debts
owed the United States.-  96 Stat. 1749; S. Rep. No.
97-378, p. 2 (1982) (the Act responded to -increasing
concern . . . expressed in Congress and elsewhere over the
increasing backlog of unpaid debts owed the federal
government-).  This suggests that Congress passed the Act
in order to strengthen the Government's hand in collecting
its debts.  Yet under the reading proposed by Texas and
the Court of Appeals, the Act would have the anomalous
effect of placing delinquent States in a position where

they had less incentive to pay their debts to the Federal
Government than they had prior to its passage.
  The Court of Appeals reasoned that the States would
not have an incentive to delay payment of their debts
because the Food Stamp Act makes state agencies liable
for actual losses caused by coupon shortages or unautho-
rized issuances, and permits the Federal Government to
recover these debts through an administrative off-set
procedure.  951 F. 2d, at 650.  But the Debt Collection
Act applies to all federal agencies, not just the FNS.
Thus, the existence of a mechanism in the Food Stamp
Act allowing the FNS to collect its debts does nothing to
encourage prompt payment of debts government-wide.
That the FNS may have already possessed adequate
sanctions to compel payment is not a reason to conclude
that the generic language in the Debt Collection Act was
meant to abrogate the existing common law obligation of
the States generally.
  Texas concedes that Congress intended to enhance the
Government's debt collection efforts by passing the Act.
It argues, however, that Congress was concerned primarily
with debts owed by private persons.  Accordingly, runs the
argument, Congress meant to relieve the States of their
duty to pay interest because the States were not the root
of the debt collection problem.
  Part of this argument persuades; Congress in the Act
tightened the screws, so to speak, on the prejudgment
interest obligations of private debtors to the Government,
and not on the States.  It may be inferred from this fact
that the former were the root of the Government's debt
collection problems which inspired the Act.  But it does
not at all follow that because Congress did not tighten the
screws on the States, it therefore intended that the screws
be entirely removed.  The more logical conclusion is that
it left the screws in place, untightened.
  As a last-ditch argument, Texas contends that its
liability for losses in the mail is not a contractual debt for
which it owes prejudgment interest, but rather a penalty
unilaterally imposed by Congress.  See Rodgers v. United
States, 332 U. S. 371, 374-376 (1947) (penalties are not
normally subject to prejudgment interest).  This argument
fails because the obligation of Texas to reimburse the
Government for a portion of the stamps lost in the mail
is quite different from that involved in Rodgers.  There
the penalties in question were unilaterally imposed by the
Agricultural Adjustment Act on farmers who exceeded
their production quotas; there was no suggestion that
the farmers ever consented to such penalties.  Here,
on the other hand, Texas signed a Federal/State Agree-
ment, the express terms of which bound the State to act
in accordance with the implementing regulations.  7 CFR
272.2(a)(2) (1986); see also n. 2, supra.  Thus, 7 CFR
274.3(c)(4) (1986), which imposed liability for mail issu-
ance losses above a specified tolerance level, was incorpo-
rated into Texas' Federal/State Agreement.  The require-
ment that the States reimburse the Federal Government
for a certain portion of mail issuance losses is not a
penalty, but a contractual obligation which the State
assumed.
  For these reasons, we hold that the Debt Collection Act
left in place the federal common law governing the
obligation of the States to pay prejudgment interest on
debts owed to the Federal Government.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals to the contrary
is accordingly
                                              Reversed.